DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 232 955 SO 014 939

AUTHOR Hobbs, Heidi H.; Moreno, Dario V.
TITLE In Search of Consensus: Role Versus Belief Systems in Bureaucratic Bargaining. An American Foreign Policy Simulation (AFPS).
INSTITUTION University of Southern California, Los Angeles. School of International Relations.
PUB DATE Apr 83
NOTE 47p.; Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (24th, Mexico City, Mexico, April 5-9, 1983).
PUB TYPE Reports - Evaluative/Feasibility (142) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Beliefs; Bureaucracy; Conflict Resolution; Curriculum Evaluation; *Decision Making; *Foreign Policy; Higher Education; *International Relations; *Role Perception; *Simulation; Values
IDENTIFIERS Bureaucratic Bargaining (Simulation)

ABSTRACT

Reported are results from two runs of the simulation "Bureaucratic Bargaining," developed to help students understand the inherent tension between roles and belief systems in American foreign policy decision making. To determine their belief systems, 165 students enrolled in an introductory international relations course were tested with a simplified version of the Holsti-Rosenau belief system questionnaire. Students were then divided into three types of teams: (1) conformist (belief systems were in harmony with role expectations of the team); (2) nonconformist (belief systems were in conflict with their bureaucratic mission); and (3) mixed. In all groups, the major decision was on whether or not to intervene in a civil war in the Philippines. As students negotiated with one another to arrive at a team policy, it was evident that role was more potent than beliefs in decision making. Feedback from students, obtained from debriefing sessions following the two runs and written essays they were asked to prepare, indicated that the simulation has potential as a teaching tool. Included in the appendices are the belief system questionnaire and the instructor's manual to the game. (RM)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

ED232955

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS: ROLE VERSUS BELIEF SYSTEMS IN BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING

An American Foreign Policy Simulation (AFPS)

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Heidi H. Hobbs
Dario V. Moreno
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Heidi H. Hobbs

and

Dario V. Moreno

School of International Relations
University of Southern California

Prepared for Presentation at the 24th Annual
International Studies Association Convention,
Maria Isabel Sheraton, Mexico City, April 5-9, 1983

SO 014 239

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like to thank all the people who made the USC runs possible. Special thanks must go to James N. Rosenau for the conceptual origins of the AFPS series and Gunnar P. Nielsson for letting us run the simulation in his course. The teaching assistants who worked with us and the students and the monitors, gathered from fellow graduate students and staff, were indispensable. Finally, to the students of I.R. 200 at USC, fall semester 1983, our most willing and interested participants, thanks.

Heidi H. Hobbs

Dario V. Moreno

School of International Relations
University of Southern California

ABSTRACT

BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING is one in a series of simulations, entitled American Foreign Policy Simulations (AFPS), which are designed to introduce students to the complexities of the decision-making process. Simulations for instructional purposes in international relations are, for the most part, some form of role playing exercises in which students represent decision-makers. An interesting dimension of role playing is the situation where a student's personal convictions may be conflictual with the role he is asked to play. BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING examines the relative potency of the role versus belief system debate by operationalizing these concepts in a game format, using the bureaucratic politics paradigm and the belief systems determined by Ole Holsti and James N. Rosenau in their study of elite decision-makers. This report summarizes the first runs of the simulation which found the role variable to be more potent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ii

ABSTRACT iii

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS 3

III. BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING 10

IV. SIMULATION RESULTS: THE USC RUNS 12

V. TEACHING POTENTIALS 19

VI. CONCLUSION 22

NOTES 24

APPENDIX A: BELIEF SYSTEM QUESTIONNAIRE 28

APPENDIX B: BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL 32

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1. Summary of Three Foreign Policy Belief Systems Currently Held by American Leaders 9

2. USC Belief System Sample 13

3. USC Group Composition 14

4. USC Vote Tallies 16

5. USC Vote Tallies By Group 17

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS: ROLE VERSUS BELIEF SYSTEMS IN BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING

An American Foreign Policy Simulation (AFPS)

INTRODUCTION

The complexities of the governmental machinery and personal perceptions involved in the formulation of American foreign policy can be difficult for students to comprehend from the confines of the classroom. Beginning students often enter the study of international relations/political science with a simplistic view of policy making. They tend to accept *a priori* what Graham Allison calls the "rational actor model" in which students "package the activities of various officials of a national government as action chosen by a unified actor, strongly analogous to an individual human being."[1] Students often believe that foreign policy is set by a small group of individuals who share common goals and preferences. This tendency to anthropomorphize the state leads undergraduates to write term papers in which nation-states are portrayed with such diverse human qualities as greed, cruelty, lust, and aggression.

This rational actor model is no longer universally accepted in the academic community. Many sophisticated

analysts have rejected this model because it fails to take into account important variables that figure into foreign policy decision-making. These variables include the bureaucratic organization of institutions, the belief systems of decision-makers, the nature of society, and the operational rules of government.

Modern scholarship on decision-making is concerned with the relative potency of these differing variables. In fact, a debate is now brewing in international relations/political science on what is the most potent variable in American foreign policy. One group of scholars contend that the bureaucratic or role variable is more important. While agreeing that role is a powerful restriction, particularly at the lower levels of the bureaucracy, other scholars argue that the individual perceptions and beliefs of policy makers are more potent in the decision-making process.

Given the complicated nature of this debate, a creative way to expose beginning students to American foreign policy decision-making is through a simulation. An operational tool increasingly employed to overcome classroom limitation, instructional simulations is, for the most part, some form of role playing exercise in which students represent decision-makers. A problem is introduced in a simulated environment which depicts an aspect of the decision-making process and students respond based on their personal perceptions of their role assignment.

Simulations are useful for the study of the decision-making process because simple description can often inhibit understanding of the complex variables involved. The standard lecture-discussion format, while providing the raw data of the study, is unable to adequately reflect the function of the many variables at work. The result is disinterest on the students' behalf and often boredom for the professor as well.

The simulation presented here, BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING, is one in a series of simulations entitled American Foreign Policy Simulations (AFPS) which seek to explore the potency of role as it compares to belief systems.[2] For student participants, it illustrates the complexity of the decision-making process through an exercise in negotiation and compromise. Two runs of this simulation were undertaken in November of 1982 at the University of Southern California in an introductory international relations course. The results of these runs will be explored and some of the feedback from student participants examined. First, a closer look at the conceptual origins of the role versus belief system debate and their operationalization for the BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING simulation is offered to set the stage for this analysis.

CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS

The critical turnabouts in U.S. foreign policy over the last decade and scholars' attempts to interpret these

events provide the conceptual origins of BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING. American foreign policy since the Tet offensive in 1968 has appeared confused, chaotic, and ineffective. The subsequent failure of the United States to successfully conclude the Vietnam War significantly altered the course of American foreign policy in the years that followed, leading many observers to suggest that there was not a consistent foreign policy making mechanism in the U.S. governmental machinery. Examples of this inconsistency abound in recent history, including such spectacular policy turnabouts as the withdrawal of SALT II, the abandonment of Detente, and abrupt policy shifts toward Iran, Nicaragua, Taiwan, and others. These policy flip-flops have suggested to U.S. citizens and the world community at large that American foreign policy lacks scope and direction.

The inability of U.S. policy makers to come to grips with vital questions of international politics has not escaped the academic community. The confused nature of American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era has fostered a scholarly debate over the source of frequent policy inconsistencies. No longer is the rational actor model of decision-making capable of explaining frequently dissonant U.S. foreign policy outputs. The rational actor assumptions of a unified nation-state in which goals are clearly defined and policy alternatives rationally weighed and chosen in terms of these goals falls short in explaining the complex

decision-making processes that take place.

Many engaged in the study of American foreign policy would argue that the increased bureaucratization of the U.S. governmental machinery involved in foreign policy formulation has produced this malady.[3] Scholars holding this view contend that the modern bureaucratic state is so complicated and entails so many actors that it is nearly impossible to arrive at a consistent foreign policy. They view the foreign policy decision-making process as having no integrated, operationalized set of goals. The different members of the policy making establishment are seen to be in pursuit solely of their own objectives, resulting in conflictual goal interpretations. The result is that American foreign policy makers can be simultaneously engaged in behavior supporting activities while pursuing conflicting goals.

Members of the bureaucracy are affected by their desire to maintain influence. This tendency can lead to support for certain policies which require greater reliance on the organization of which one is a member. Participants in a policy decision examine proposals to gauge whether or not they would help their particular organization carry out its missions. For example, in formulating the MX decision, the Budget Bureau and the Comptroller's Office in the Pentagon are concerned with how it would affect their ability to keep down the military budget. The Office of the Secretary of Defense views the decision in terms of the U.S.-Soviet

strategic balance, while the State Department is concerned with the impact of deployment on relations with European allies and the Soviet Union.[4]

The bureaucratic mission of each agency affects the individual decision-makers of that agency through their formal role definitions. J. N. Rosenau in his pre-theory article defines role as pertaining to the "external behavior of officials that is generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the individual characteristics of the role occupants."[5] Every role embraces certain responsibilities that have to be performed and expectations that have to be met if the occupants are to remain in them. This variable thus refers to certain expectations and responsibilities which are required of members of the policy making establishment by virtue of the office they occupy. Simply put, this variable is reminiscent of the old political adage of "where you stand is where you sit."

In contrast to this bureaucratic interpretation, other scholars argue that the Vietnam War marked a watershed in the breakdown of the post-World War II containment consensus among foreign policy decision-makers.[6] Their perception is based on the contention that following World War II, there was an elite-wide consensus or shared belief system on the nature of the international system and the direction that American foreign policy should take.[7] This consensus viewed the major threat to U.S. interests abroad

as communist expansion, which led to the policy of containment. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam marked the breakdown of the containment consensus and with it, American foreign policy lost its guiding mechanism.

The theoretical thrust of this argument postulates the explanation of behavior through the belief systems of actors in the policy process. Belief systems are composed of personal images of the past, present, and future, including all the "accumulated, organized knowledge that the organism has about itself in the world."[8] According to Ole Holsti, belief systems are

> the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics.[9]

Belief systems, then, influence policy makers' perception of reality and often guide their decisions. As a result, policy may not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation but instead to the policy makers' image of the problem at hand.[10]

Many recent studies have been devoted to assessing the importance of belief systems in the breakdown of the post-World War II containment consensus.[11] One of the most provocative of these studies and the impetus for the AFPS series is the long term inquiry by Ole Holsti and J. N. Rosenau on American elite attitudes.[12] Based upon a mail

questionnaire of governmental and non-governmental elite leaders administered in 1976 and again in 1980, Holsti and Rosenau have found convincing evidence of deep cleavages within the policy making community over the goals and role of the U.S. in the international system. The Holsti-Rosenau study has not only failed to turn up any signs of a global perspective widely shared by leaders, but it also has uncovered a series of patterns which greatly reduce the likelihood of such a consensus evolving slowly or being mobilized by a charismatic leader, a political party, and/or a severe crisis. They conclude that the containment consensus of the 1950's has given way to at least three highly structured and mutually exclusive belief systems which they have labeled Cold War Internationalists, Post Cold War Internationalists, and Neo-Isolationists. A summary of the beliefs comprising these systems is offered in Table 1.

Both the Cold War Internationalists and the Post Cold War Internationalists perceive the Soviet Union as a major threat to world peace. For the former, however, the Soviets are almost exclusively the problem, while the latter perceive other issues, especially those involving North-South relations, as also high on the global agenda. Neo-Isolationists, on the other hand, view the main problems facing the U.S. as exclusively internal. Their concerns include such issues as unemployment, inflation, environmental protection and urban decay. The prevalence of these three belief systems in all

Table 1

SUMMARY OF THREE FOREIGN POLICY BELIEF SYSTEMS CURRENTLY HELD BY AMERICAN LEADERS*

	Cold War Internationalists	Post-Cold War Internationalists	Neo-Isolationists
Structure of the international system	Bipolar	Multipolar	Multipolar
Loci of primary problems	East-West issues	North-South as well as East-West issues	Within the United States
Sources of the main threats to the United States	The Soviet Union	Poverty, inequitable distribution of resources, population pressures, and regional antagonisms in the Third World as well as the Soviet Union	Decaying cities, inflation, unemployment, cultural decadence, environmental depredation, etc., at home
Nature of conflict	Zero sum	Non-zero sum	Non-zero sum
View of the Soviet Union	Powerful and aggressive	Militarily powerful but not awesome as they otherwise resemble a developing country	Powerful but beset with domestic problems and, thus, conservative
View of the U.S. role in the world	Leader of the non-Communist world, protector of its integrity and values	Selective leadership on key issues	U.S. capacity for leadership abroad highly limited and of doubtful desirability
Bases of U.S. foreign policy	Keep up with the Soviets militarily and respond to their efforts to extend their influence in the Third World	Promote a multiplicity of economic and political institutions to facilitate movement toward world order and away from confrontation	Keep foreign involvements and commitments to a minimum (i.e., primarily to Western Europe, Japan and to Israel)

*Reproduced from James N. Rosenau and Ole Holsti, "Public Opinion and Soviet Foreign Policy: Competing Belief Systems in the Policy-Making Process," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXXII (June-July 1979). p. 8.

walks of American life, combined with the decentralized character of the country's policy making machinery, can thus, according to Holsti and Rosenau, be viewed as a prime source of the inconsistency and vacillation that has marked American foreign policy since the Vietnam War.

BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING

BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING has been developed for the classroom to illustrate the inherent tension between roles and belief systems in the American foreign policy decision-making process. It simulates this process by assigning students to bureaucratic roles which may or may not be in conflict with their personal belief systems. To operationalize these concepts, students are first tested for the three Holsti-Rosenau belief systems through a simplified version of their original questionnaire (see Appendix A). The results from this pre-simulation test are then used to determine the bureaucratic role to which the participants are assigned.

The game begins as students are divided into eight teams representing bureaucratic entities, four from the Department of State and four from the Department of Defense. A common problem is introduced through a conflict scenario set in the Philippines and each entity is charged with developing a policy recommendation consistent with its bureaucratic mission. The game manual outlines the

organizational goals of each team to guide policy formulation (a copy of the Instructor's Game Manual can be found in Appendix B). Student assignment based on the belief system questionnaire may be such that his or her personal belief system is in conflict with the team's bureaucratic mission. For example, a student whose personal belief system places the promotion of human rights as a high priority for American foreign policy might be assigned to the Navy team. The bureaucratic mission for this team in the simulation is to sacrifice human rights considerations for retention of bases in the Philippines.

By operationalizing the concepts of the belief system, using Holsti and Rosenau's distinctions, and role variables in a game environment for students, learning becomes fun while an important experiment is conducted. Not only do students learn about the American foreign policy process, but an important lesson can be taught in terms of hypothesis testing.

Two hypotheses can be offered which contrast the role versus belief system variables in a bureaucratic decision-making process.

I. If role is more potent in the simulation groups, then decisions will be made in accordance with the bureaucratic mission of the participating agency or bureau.

II. If belief systems are more potent in the simulation groups, then decisions will be made in accordance with the individual belief systems of the members of the participating agency or bureau.

The strength of belief systems is tested through the preparation of policy statements and a voting procedure within the role structures. Either belief system or role variable will appear more influential through a simple test which can be administered within the context of the game and an additional tool of knowledge utilized.

There is a continuing debate in such a situation as to which variable, the individual or his role, will be stronger. Rosenau hypothesizes role to be stronger in his analysis of senators' perceptions of two Secretaries of State.[13] A critique of his study by Stassen suggests a more interactive relationship between role and individuals' beliefs.[14] Stassen does contend, however, that role is still a powerful restriction, particularly at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the influence of individual perception cannot be discounted in the analysis of decision-making.

SIMULATION RESULTS: THE USC RUNS

The first step in testing the simulation hypotheses was to determine the belief systems of the participants. A questionnaire was administered prior to the beginning of the exercise which tested for the three Holsti-Rosenau belief systems (see Appendix A). While the students were told that the questionnaire was a part of the simulation, they were not told how it would be used or what it was testing for.

There were 165 participants in the USC runs, taken from an introductory international relations course. Full data were gathered on 148 and the belief system breakdown for this group was as follows:

Table 2

USC BELIEF SYSTEM SAMPLE[15]

	No. of Students in Score Range	Percentage %
Cold War Internationalist	54	37
Post-Cold War Internationalist	85	57
Neo-Isolationist	9	6
TOTAL	148	100%

The second step in the experiment was dividing the participants into teams. Three types of teams were created: conformist, non-conformist, and mixed. In the conformist groups, the belief systems of the members were in harmony with the role expectations of the team. The non-conformist groups consisted of members whose belief systems were in conflict with their bureaucratic mission, while the mixed groups were composed of a sample of two or more belief systems. A summary of the groups' composition can be found in Table 3.

Table 3

USC GROUP COMPARISON

	Composition					
	Cold War Inter-nationalist	Post Cold War Inter-nationalist	Neo-Isolationist	Number of Participants With Data	Number of Participants Without Data	Total Participants
GAME I						
Department of Defense						
Office of the Secy.	5	2	-	7	1	8
Navy	3	4	2	9	1	10
Army	2	5	-	7	0	7
Air Force	-	-	-	7	1	8
Total	10		2	30	3	33
Department of State						
Office of the Secy.	-	10	1	11	0	11
Human Rights	6	1	-	7	0	7
Pol-Mil Affairs	-	7	-	7	-	7
SE Asia/Pac Affairs	6	4	-	10	0	10
Total	12	22	1	35	0	35
GAME II						
Department of Defense						
Office of the Secy.	8	1	1	10	0	10
Navy	-	9	1	10	0	10
Army	9	-	-	9	2	11
Air Force	5	7	-	12	3	15
Total	22	17	2	41	5	46
Department of State						
Office of the Secy.	3	6	-	9	3	12
Human Rights	-	7	3	10	1	11
Pol-Mil Affairs	6	4	1	11	0	11
SE Asia/Pac Affairs	1	11	-	12	2	14
Total	10	28	4	42	6	48

In all groups, the major vote was on whether or not to intervene in a civil war in the Philippines (see Scenario in Appendix B). Prior to the simulation, students prepared position papers which dealt with this question, as well as debating it in the group deliberations. The operational assumption for the voting patterns of the groups was dictated by their bureaucratic missions as defined in the Game Manual (Appendix B). The basic role orientation for the Department of Defense suggested intervention and the role orientation for the Department of State suggested non-intervention.

The Holsti-Rosenau belief systems were operationalized for the simulation and the scenario question as follows. It was postulated that the Cold War Internationalists would favor intervention as dictated by their strategic concerns. While the Post-Cold War Internationalists share these strategic concerns, it was suggested that their interest in Third World problems would prevent favoring intervention. The Neo-Isolationists would place U.S. domestic interests first and would also shy from intervention. Thus, the group compositions were based on these assessments.

The final step of the simulation was the actual bargaining process where students negotiated with one another to arrive at a team policy. The results of these deliberations was such to suggest role to be more potent than beliefs in these simulation runs. As can be seen from

Table 4

USC VOTE TALLIES

	Intervention			
	Position Paper		Final Vote	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Department of Defense				
Cold War Internationalist				
November 11, 1982	10	0	10	0
November 19, 1982	19	3	22	0
Total	29	3	32	0
Vote Shifts		+3		
Post Cold War Internationalist				
November 11, 1982	13	5	17	1
November 19, 1982	11	6	14	3
Total	24	11	31	4
Vote Shifts		+7		
Neo-Isolationist				
November 11, 1982	2	0	2	0
November 19, 1982	1	1	1	1
Total	3	1	3	1
Vote Shifts		0		
Department of State				
Cold War Internationalist				
November 11, 1982	8	4	7	5
November 19, 1982	7	3	0	10
Total	15	7	7	15
Vote Shifts		-8		
Post Cold War Internationalist				
November 11, 1982	12	10	10	12
November 19, 1982	8	20	2	26
Total	20	30	12	38
Vote Shifts		-8		
Neo-Isolationist				
November 11, 1982	1	0	0	1
November 19, 1982	1	3	0	4
Total	2	3	0	5
Vote Shifts		-2		

Table 5

USC VOTE TALLIES BY GROUP

	Intervention							
	Position Paper (Yes No)				Final Vote (Yes No)			
	Cold War Internationalist		Post Cold War Internationalist		Neo-Isolationist		Total	
GAME I								
Department of Defense								
Office of the Secretary	5-0	(5-0)	2-0	(2-0)		-	7-0	(7-0)
Navy	3-0	(3-0)	4-0	(4-0)	2-0	(2-0)	9-0	(9-0)
Army	2-0	(2-0)	2-3	(5-0)		-	4-3	(7-0)
Air Force		-	5-2	(6-1)		-	5-2	(6-1)
Total	10-0	(10-0)	13-5	(17-1)	2-0	(2-0)	25-5	(29-1)
Department of State								
Office of the Secretary		-	5-5	(3-7)	1-0	(0-1)	6-5	(3-8)
Human Rights	3-3	(5-1)	1-0	(1-0)		-	4-3	(6-1)
Political-Military Affairs		-	6-1	(6-1)		-	6-1	(6-1)
S.E. Asia & Pac. Affairs	5-1	(2-4)	0-4	(0-4)		-	6-4	(2-8)
Total	8-4	(7-5)	12-10	(10-12)	1-0	(0-1)	22-13	(17-18)
GAME II								
Department of Defense								
Office of the Secretary	7-1	(8-0)	1-0	(1-0)	1-0	(1-0)	9-1	(10-0)
Navy		-	6-3	(7-2)	0-1	(0-1)	6-4	(7-3)
Army	7-2	(9-0)		-		-	7-2	(9-0)
Air Force	5-0	(5-0)	4-3	(6-1)		-	9-3	(11-1)
Total	19-3	(22-0)	11-6	(14-3)	1-1	(1-1)	31-10	(37-4)
Department of State								
Office of the Secretary	3-0	(0-3)	2-4	(0-6)		-	5-5	(0-10)
Human Rights		-	2-5	(1-6)	0-3	(0-3)	2-8	(1-9)
Political Military Affairs	4-2	(0-6)	2-2	(0-4)	1-0	(0-1)	7-4	(0-11)
S.E. Asia & Pac. Affairs	0-1	(0-1)	2-9	(1-10)		-	2-10	(1-11)
Total	7-3	(0-10)	8-20	(2-26)	1-3	(0-4)	16-26	(2-40)

Table 4, which contrasts vote by belief system within departments, vote shifts in the Department of Defense were all in a positive or yes to intervention direction. In the Department of State, all vote shifts were in a negative direction or no to intervention. The positive and negative vote shifts of these departments respectively would imply greater potency of the role variable. The vote shifts were not unique to any one belief system, upholding this conclusion.

This conclusion was reinforced by the results from the individual groups as belief systems were overruled in favor of role responsibilities. A summary of votes by group can be found in Table 5. While all three types of groups tended to favor the role variable, this evidence is not consistently supportive. In Game I, there were two major exceptions to this trend. In the State Department's Bureau for Human Rights, Cold War Internationalists stuck with their belief system and advocated intervention. A more extreme exception occurred in the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs which consisted of all Post-Cold War Internationalists, the majority of which (6-1) favored intervention. This policy was not consistent with their role or belief system as operationalized for the scenario. Nevertheless, the overall trend is supportive of role having the greater potency than belief system for these simulation runs.

TEACHING POTENTIALS

Following both runs of the simulation, a general debriefing was held for all the student participants. The conceptual origins of the simulation were outlined and the Rosenau-Holsti belief system classifications introduced. The hypotheses of the role versus belief system test were put forth and preliminary results presented (Table 4) which indicated role to be stronger in the USC runs. Observations were solicited from the students about their simulation experience. Following the debriefing, all students were asked to prepare a written essay which addressed three questions:

1. How did you arrive at your policy position?
2. In the course of the simulation, what happened to your original position?
3. What did you learn from the simulation?

The feedback offered during the debriefing and contained within these essays not only tells what the students learned, but also proved educational for the simulation designers as well.

A cursory examination of student comments reveals this simulation's potential as a teaching tool. From the general standpoint of what the students learned, four themes were recurrent:

1. The complexity of the decision-making process.
2. The number of actors involved in foreign policy formulation.

3. The competing interests of bureaucratic entities.

4. The contrasting nature of role versus belief systems.

A sampling of student comments supports these themes.

> Most importantly, the simulation gave students a working knowledge of foreign decision-making within the United States government. It familiarized us with the structure of the National Security Council as well as some of the mechanics and special skills required of participants in the State and Defense Departments. Side benefits of the simulation involve learning how to work with others towards a common goal and how to formulate your own opinions.

> The reason that I think that a simulation exercise is effective in teaching the principles of policy making is that it allows a student to learn through experience rather than just reading about the whole operation in a textbook. Although I must admit that the simulation was not identical to an actual crisis situation, it was close enough for me to realize how numerous the factors are that affect foreign policy making. Probably the most important thing I learned was the advantages and drawbacks of a bureaucracy.

> In retrospect to the simulation exercise, there are many lessons to be learned, aside from the deeper understanding of the workings of foreign policy decision making. The primary lesson is the true comprehension of the difficulty to deal with a wide diversity of people. Each person has their own opinion and ideas, and as a result it appears to be often difficult to reach a consensus on many issues.

> I think the most important thing I learned from this simulation was that there are many different reasons why people take the positions they do. That the method of arriving at a final policy position is not an easy chore and is definitely not fool proof. The most important thing though is that not everyone will be

satisfied and the object is to satisfy the largest group you can while reaching a decision both logically and reasonably.

Another interesting aspect of a few of the essays were attempts to relate activity in the simulation to other classes and life experiences. One of the best essays was written by a student who was studying the bureaucratic process in a sociology class and related his experiences to some of the readings for his course. A particularly amusing paper explored the interaction of different team members as embodiments of their belief systems. Written in California's "mellow-speak," this novel interpretation sheds light on some of the dynamics at work in a simulation.

> I was sure of disagreement before entering the simulation but the disagreements were rooted in entirely different beliefs. It amazes me that such a similar group of people can be operating individually on such different streams of consciousness. The screaming paranoia of some people was really disturbing. Some people got so into power trips while others sat quietly oblivious to the meaning of it all. It was like a real sociological observation, a real statement about mankind. This play, this psycho-drama was real in the minds of some of the more disturbed. I observed the different levels of neurosis, and focused on the reality which was felt by various statements. "We better get them before they get us" was the phrase bleated sporadically by a young woman with a crazed look in her eyes. Another young man coming from a place of U.S. patriotism, I'm sure, had his own interpretation of the reality presented to all of us; he said, "America needs that base, we better kill off Nunez and his followers." I also learned how people as a whole are about looking out for their own space. It seems that man is basically a selfish animal and everyone wants his own way. Compromise and reason are secondary.

While this is an extreme post-simulation statement, it captures the excitement of the game and its usefulness as a teaching device. Students not only learn about the decision-making process, but people as well in a fun atmosphere.

CONCLUSION

The final cumulation of the results from these first two runs of BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING showed a need for improvement. Cursory observations would suggest some weaknesses in the operationalization of the role versus belief system hypotheses. It is possible that the drive for consensus in the different teams became the driving force of the voting procedure. If so, role would always win as emphasis was placed on bureaucratic mission and its successful completion, which required consensual agreement. The drive "to win" also became very strong for many students, defining win as the adoption of their policy either by other members of their bureau or by the President at the end of the game. This drive may also have shaped voting behavior.

These limitations have not negated the initial success of this first effort which has sustained a continued interest in the development of BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING and the APPS series. Not only has this simulation proved to be a useful teaching technique for depicting the decision-making process, but it also provides an operational method to explore the potency of role versus belief system in a simulated environment.

By far, however, the best part of this simulation is the relative ease with which it can be used in any classroom and the enthusiasm with which students participate. It is always satisfying for those interested in teaching to feel their students have enjoyed learning. BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING offers a model to achieve this goal.

NOTES

[1]Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[2]Three simulations are being developed under the rubric of American Foreign Policy Simulations (AFPS) which serve as both teaching tools of decision-making and explore the potency of individual versus role variables:

1. BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING: The U.S. Policymaking Establishment;
2. INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING: The North American Community; and
3. SOVIET INTERVENTION: American Perception.

The binding thread of the three exercises is the examination of individual variables, operationalized as shared perspectives or belief systems, and their impact on role playing in simulations of the American Foreign policy formulation process. Together, as a package, the three simulations cover some of the more salient issues in American foreign policy.

BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING simulates the decision-making process of the U.S. government in foreign affairs. It is designed for students at the introductory level of study in international relations and can accommodate a class of 100 students in one run.

INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING and SOVIET INTERVENTION are designed for more advanced students of international relations and can handle only a smaller number of participants.

INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING examines the policy community in terms of economic issues, vested domestic interests, and the relationship of the U.S. to its border neighbors to the north and south, Canada and Mexico. Special interest is placed on the role of ethnic groups, labor concerns, and business entities in the American foreign policy process. SOVIET INTERVENTION is a simulation of Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe and U.S. policy response. Assaying the political-military considerations in the superpower configuration, SOVIET INTERVENTION is concerned with the operation of the U.S. policy process at the executive level--National Security Council (NSC), Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Presidential decision-making.

[3]Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Morton H. Halperin with P. Clapp and A. Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974); and John D. Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

[4]Morton H. Halperin et al., 1974, pp. 26-27.

[5]James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), pp. 115-169.

[6]James N. Rosenau and Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Soviet Foreign Policy: Competing Belief Systems in the Policy-Making Process," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (July-August 1979), pp. 4-14.

[7]Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978).

[8]G. A. Miller, E. Galanter, and K. H. Pribham, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New York: Holt, 1960), p. 16.

[9]Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case History," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VI, No. 3 (1962), p. 246.

[10]Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. III, No. 2 (1959), pp. 347-349.

[11]B. Bardes and R. Oldenick, "The Dimensions of Mass Opinion on Foreign Policy: A Trend Analysis," presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association (1980); Bardes and Oldenick, "Beyond Internationalism: A Case for Multiple System Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes," Social Science Quarterly (December 1978), pp. 495-508; S. Bennett, "Attitude Structures and Foreign Policy Opinions," Social Science Quarterly (December 1974), pp. 732-742; J. Chace, "Is Foreign Policy Consensus Possible?" Foreign Affairs (1978), pp. 1-16; P. E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in P. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964); B. B. Hughes, The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco: Freeman, 1978); H. M. Kritzer, "Ideology and American Political Elites," Public Opinion

Quarterly (Winter 1978), pp. 484-502; M. Maggiotto and E. Wittkoph, "American Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly (December 1981); A. Modigliani, "Hawks and Dovies, Isolation and Political Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy," American Political Science Review (September 1972), pp. 960-978; W. Rodgers, B. Stuhler and D. Koenig, "A Comparison of Informed and General Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1967); and E. R. Wittkoph, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes: An Alternative View," Social Science Quarterly (March 1981), pp. 108-123.

[12]Foreign Policy Leadership Project Studies by Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau:

"The 'Lessons' of Vietnam: A Study of American Leadership," a paper presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, February 25-29, 1976, 55 pp.

"Vietnam Revisited: A Comparison of the Recollections of Foreign Service and Military Officers of the Lessons, Sources, and Consequences of the War," a paper presented at the Xth Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, Scotland, August 16-19, 1976, 23 pp.

"The Meaning of Vietnam: Belief Systems of American Leaders," International Journal, Vol. XXXII (Summer 1977), pp. 452-474.

"Problem Recognition: Belief Systems of American Leaders," a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association/South, Columbia, S.C., October 27-29, 1977, 58 pp.

"America's Foreign Policy Agenda: The Post-Vietnam Belief of American Leaders," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan (eds.), Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Sage, 1979), pp. 231-268.

"Public Opinion and Soviet Foreign Policy: Competing Belief Systems in the Policy-Making Process," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (July-August 1979), pp. 4-14.

"Cold War Axioms in the Post-Vietnam Era," in Alexander L. George, Ole R. Holsti and Randolph M. Siverson (eds), International System Change (Westview Press, 1980), pp. 263-301.

"Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born? The Impact of Generation on Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 44 (Spring 1980), pp. 1-22.

"The United States in (and Out of) Vietnam: An Adaptive Transformation?" Yearbook of World Affairs (1980), pp. 186-204.

"Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," World Politics, Vol. XXXII (January 1980), pp. 1-56.

"The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Women in Leadership Positions," Journal of Politics, Vol. 43 (May 1981), pp. 326-357.

"The Three-Headed Eagle Revisited: Who Are the Cold War Internationalists, Post-Cold War Internationalists, and Isolationists?" a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Philadelphia, March 18, 1981.

"American Leadership in a Shrinking World; The Breakdown of Consensuses and the Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems," a paper presented at the Conference on Political Culture in the United States in the 1970s: Continuity and Change, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat, Frankfurt, June 15-20, 1981.

[13]James N. Rosenau, "Private Preference and Political Responsibility: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables in the Behavior of U.S. Senators," in J. D. Singer (ed.). Quantitative International Politics: Insight and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 17-50.

[14]Glen H. Stassen, "Individual Preferences versus Role-Constraint in Policy-Making: Senatorial Response to Secretaries Acheson and Dulles," World Politics, Vol. XXV (October 1972), pp. 96-119.

[15]An interesting point aside but not statistically relevant is the proximity of these percentage breakdowns for a predominantly freshman, international relations course at a private institution and the Holsti-Rosenau elite breakdown which found 30 percent Cold War Internationalists, 55 percent Post-Cold War Internationalists, and 15 percent Neo-Isolationsists in their sample. There are some interesting areas of speculation about elite family relationships and the strength of socio-economic variables in determining the nature of belief systems based on this data, but they are not in the scope of the present study.

APPENDIX A

BELIEF SYSTEM QUESTIONNAIRE

Guidelines for Instructors:

The following questionnaire is used to place students in the three Holsti-Rosenau belief systems. It is to be administered prior to student role assignment. The objective of the questionnaire and the belief systems it tests for should not be revealed to the students until the debriefing session following the simulation run to reduce bias.

To operationalize the questionnaire, a numerical value has been designated for each response and a proportionate score range established for the three belief systems. The scores are in parentheses after each response and the point distribution for the belief systems is as follows:

Cold War Internationalist	80-100 points
Post-Cold War Internationalist	60-79 points
Neo-Isolationist	Below 60 points

These point ranges may be scaled based on the highest score for the sample tested.

KEY

I. Following are ten questions concerning current issues of primary concern in U.S. foreign policy. Choose the answer which best expresses your views on these issues. Choose only one answer per question and put all on answer sheet.

1. The major threat to global peace is

   a) the Soviet Union (5)
   b) Third World poverty (3)
   c) internal problems in the U.S. (1)

2. The Soviet Union is basically

   a) a powerful, expanding superpower (5)
   b) a strong power hindered by internal problems at times (3)
   c) too beset by internal problems to be considered dangerous (1)

3. The role of the U.S. in the international system should be that of

   a) leader of the free world (5)
   b) major actor in the international system (3)
   c) isolated super state (1)

4. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon demonstrates

   a) the utility of military force in solving political problems (5)
   b) the political problems associated with the use of force (3)
   c) the weakness of the two superpowers in influencing events outside their immediate blocs (1)

5. The U.S. embargo of equipment sales for construction of the Soviet pipeline through Europe illustrates

   a) the importance of economic factors in political issues (3)
   b) primacy of security (5)
   c) the unreliability of European allies (1)

6. The U.S. should support human rights in the Third World

   a) only when it is in the U.S. interest (5)
   b) as a matter of principle (3)
   c) in only very limited circumstances because it is basically none of the U.S. business (1)

7. The apartheid practices of the South African regime should be met with U.S.

   a) pressure (3)
   b) tolerance (5)
   c) indifference (1)

8. International communism is

a) a threat to world peace and should be contained (5)
b) no longer tied to Soviet interests (2)
c) too disorganized to be of real concern (2)

9. Less developed nations should

a) follow the U.S. model of development (5)
b) be left to develop at their own pace (1)
c) be given capital assistance toward development (3)

10. The current military build-up by the U.S. is

a) not enough (5)
b) just right (3)
c) excessive (1)

II. Here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal by choosing a) very important, b) somewhat important, or c) not important at all. Choose only one answer per question.

11. Containing communism (a=5, b=3, c=1)

12. Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries (a=3, b=5, c=1)

13. Defending our allies' security (a=5, b=3, c=1)

14. Promoting and defending our own security (a=5, b=3, c=3)

15. Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations (a=3, b=5, c=1)

16. Protecting the jobs of American workers (a=1, b=3, c=5)

17. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries (a=3, b=5, c=1)

18. Having a military capability second to none (a=5, b=3, c=1)

19. Limiting imports from abroad to protect U.S. workers (a=1, b=3, c=5)

20. Reducing foreign commitments (a=1, b=3, c=5)

APPENDIX B

BUREAUCRATIC BARGAINING: An American Foreign Policy Simulation (AFPS)

INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL

Level of Analysis

The level of analysis in this simulation is the individual. It is designed to confront students with decisions in a group context, such that an individual's decision may or may not be consistent with the position of other team members.

Theoretical Perspective

The theoretical objective of this study is to examine the relationship between individual's belief systems and the bureaucratic role they are assigned. For students, it illustrates the complexity of the American foreign policy machinery and the difficulty in obtaining consensus on what U.S. foreign policy goals should be. Students also learn about the scientific method in social inquiry as the simulation tests hypotheses on the belief system-role relationship within the game context.

Setting

The setting of this study is the U.S. governmental bureaucracy which has inputs to foreign policy decision making. Students representing eight bureaucratic entities, four from the Department of State and four from the Department of Defense, will develop policies consistent with their bureaucratic role to deal with a commonly imposed problem.

Interaction Environment

There are three levels of interaction in the simulation: between team members of each bureaucratic entity, between bureaus within their respective departments, and between bureaus and the control team. These levels of interaction correspond to the three phases of the simulation outlined

below. Briefly, in the first place, students must work together in their respective teams to choose their best policy alternative. This policy must then be presented to other teams in the department in the second phase of the game and a policy suited to all must be developed. The final game phase consists of all entities seated in their respective departments meeting as advisors to a National Security Council meeting, chaired by the Simulation Director or an assistant.

Problem

Given a scenario of events (see attached), students will determine what policies their bureaucratic unit would be most likely to pursue. The most important consideration for all teams is that the present administration remain in control and their policies should be consistent with what it perceives to be its safest course.

Materials

A game manual is provided for students which includes descriptions of the bureaucratic entities and their missions, rules of the game, and a scenario of events prompting play. A questionnaire which examines students' belief systems is also required, to be administered prior to simulation role assignment (Appendix A).

There are no strict facility requirements. A large classroom can accommodate eight small teams. The larger the class or when possible, it is best to use separate rooms for each team, separate rooms for department meetings, and a large hall for the final phase of the game.

A fairly large support group is needed for the actual simulation but willing participants seem to be easily found among graduate students, staff and active undergraduates. A minimum of eight monitors, a director and assistant are required for one run.

Rules of the Game

I. Procedural

A. Class Preparation

Step 1: Administer Belief System Questionnaire recommended time sequence (rts): four weeks prior to simulation

Step 2: Lecture/Class Discussion on the Decision Making Process
rts: two weeks

Step 3: Assign Roles and Distribute Game Manual
rts: one week
Based on role assignments, students will prepare a one page policy statement due the day of the actual simulation.

Step 4: Simulation
rts: allow two hours for complete game including logistics

Step 5: De-briefing
rts: one to two hour de-briefing; one week for essay
A post-simulation discussion should be held at least one day after the simulation. Based on this discussion and their experiences, students may prepare a post-simulation essay addressing three questions:

1. How did you arrive at your policy position?
2. In the course of the simulation, what happened to your original position?
3. What did you learn from the simulation?

B. Game Sequence

Phase I: Intra-bureau Negotiation and Policy Formulation
rts: 30 minutes
Students will use their policy statements to negotiate a bureau policy. Votes will be taken on policy issues to achieve consensus. All votes must be in writing.

Phase II: Intra-departmental Negotiation and Policy Formulation
rts: 30 minutes
Each bureau will be given 5 minutes to present their policy to the Department and the Office of the Secretary will respond. Debate may ensue between bureaucratic entities within departments subject to recognition by the Secretary's office.

Phase III: Resolution/National Security Council Meeting
rts: 30 minutes
All teams will come together with a control President for a National Security Council Meeting. A representative, the Secretary, from both Departments will present

GAME SEQUENCE SUMMARY

PHASE III: RESOLUTION



their position. The President has the option of calling on bureaus for additional information before deciding on the best policy option for the run.

II. Mediation

Students are held responsible for settling disputes within groups. The grievance procedure described below provides an institutional framework for conflict resolution within the game context. Problems outside the game should be handled by group monitors, the Simulation Director or an assistant.

III. Behavior Constraints

Each team is given 200 points with the game objective to maintain the greatest total for continued participation. For every no vote on a policy option considered within teams in Phase I, 50 points will be subtracted. Four no votes or 200 points on any policy will render the bureau inoperative and only by achieving consensus can the group reenter the game. There can be as many series of votes as needed in the time allowed to reach consensus. Votes must be in writing and tallied by the group monitor.

A student who feels his team is totally acting outside its bureaucratic mission may undermine the group by leaking to the press. A leak is accomplished by a note given to a monitor. For every leak, 100 points will be subtracted. Two leaks render the team inoperative and consensus must be reached to accommodate deviants for the group to reenter the game.

IV. Goals

The major objective for each team is to successfully pursue its bureaucratic mission. Actual descriptions of the functions of each bureauctatic entity may be found in the U.S. Government Manual. Specific goals for this scenario may be derived from these general guidelines.

Department of Defense

Office of the Secretary -- Maintain bases in the Philippines
Success if troops sent
Intra-department consensus

Army -- Conduct of successful operations in Philippines if necessary
Healthy defense posture elsewhere if troops diverted to Philippines

Navy -- Maintenance of bases in Philippines
Successful operations in Philippines if necessary

Air Force -- Maintenance of bases in Philippines
Successful operations in Philippines if necessary

Department of State

Office of the Secretary -- Maintain friendly relations with the Philippines
Intra-department consensus

Political-Military Affairs -- Maintain security and stability in the region
Secure bases

Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs -- Improvement of human rights in the Philippines

East Asian and Pacific Affairs -- Friendly relations with the Philippines and surrounding states
Security and stability of region

SCENARIO

A growing revolutionary movement in the Philippines gets a boost when President Marcos uses money from the country's newly discovered oil wealth for his own personal enrichment and that of his family. The leader of the revolutionary movement, Huberto Nunez, a self-proclaimed socialist, appears to be about to win a long guerrilla war (civil war). Nunez has secretly promised the U.S. that upon his victory, he will:

1. not seek Soviet aid;
2. maintain friendly relations with the U.S.;
3. observe "international standards" of human rights; and

4. sell the U.S. oil at world prices.

However, Nunez has also said that upon his victory, he will:

1. nationalize with compensation American firms in the Philippines;
2. introduce a socialist economy;
3. maintain friendly relations with all socialist nations; and
4. expel American naval and air bases from the island.

There are vague intelligence reports that Nunez has Cuban and East German advisors and that many of his arms are of Soviet and East European make. At the same time, President Marcos, whose days appear to be numbered, has asked for American aid under a bilateral defense treaty. Marcos has requested ground troops and air and sea support in order to defeat the rebels. Defense analysts point out that U.S. troops will have to do most of the fighting if Marcos is to survive.

President Reagan of the United States calls in his Secretaries of State and Defense and asks for policy positions. The question is, does the U.S. send troops? In coming up with policy recommendations, each agency must qualify its decision with regards to its bureaucratic mission.